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BAR BRIEFS
A BRIEF SURVEY OF COURT DECISIONS
CONSTRUING THE NORTH DAKOTA BILL OF RIGHTS
By Prof. Ross C. Tisdale
(Continued from last issue)
"Even the provisions in the national Constitution upon the
subject, and those which are to be found in the Magna Charta,
cannot apply in cases of this kind .... the purpose of the framers
of those instruments was to protect the individual against arbi-
trary and cruel legislative and judicial action, and against the
tyranny of the courts, rather than to hamper those courts in
the proper fulfillment of the duties which were imposed upon
them. It was to restrain and control public officers, and for the
protection of the people, rather than to excuse those public of-
ficers for remissness in duties . . . . They were popular Bills of
Rights; they were not official Bills of Rights." Bruce, J., in
Lee v. Dolan, 34 N. D. 449, 463, 158 N. W. 1007, 1012 (1916).
The court went on to define several terms in the constitution.
"Cruel" has always been associated with physical pain and suffer-
ing. "Unusual" punishment is not inflicted by amercement. A
punishment based on the amount of loss is a common feature
of the criminal law. For example, in State v. Jochim, 55 N. D.
313, 213 N. W. 484 (1927), it was held that a sentence of three
years for grand larceny was not a cruel or unusual punishment,
where a confirmed offender confessed his guilt to curry favor
with the court. The court said that "cruel" referred to the form
of punishment, and "unusual" referred to the frequency. "To
.come within this prohibition it must be both cruel and unusual.
To revive some of the old penalties such as amputation of the
hand that seized the turkey, burning at the stake, boiling in
oil or the placing of the defendant in the stocks or pillory might
be considered 'cruel' or 'unusual' punishment . . . ." Burr, J., in
State v. Jochim, supra, 55 N. D. 321, 213 N. W. 488. Hence a
statute permitting a sentence from either six months to five
years in the penitentiary where it appears on the trial that the
defendant has stolen either poultry or livestock is not violative
of Section 6 of the Constitution. State v. Jochim, Supra. "It
may be somewhat unusual to sentence one to the penitentiary
for what has generally be regarded as petit larceny, but if the
legislature sees fit to classify larceny according to the moral de-
pravity or meanness evidenced by its commission rather than
according to the value of the property stolen, no reason is ap-
parent why it might not with legal propriety do so . . . ." Bird-
zell, J., in State v. Kingen, 58 N. D. 327, 330, 226 N. W. 505, 506
(1929).
SECTION 7
The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain
inviolate; but a jury in civil cases, in courts not of record, may
consist of less than twelve men, as may be prescribed by law.
The constitutional right of trial by jury is not violated by
conferring the duty on women.
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"The whole theory of jury qualifications in this country is
the theory that electors are eligible to jury duty. This is the
theory of this state. True it was male citizens having the quali-
fications of electors, but at that time only men were electors.
The legislature of the state has some discretion in defining the
qualifications of jurors. From the very first certain male citizens
such as judges, sheriffs, coroners, attorneys at law engaged in
practice, etc. were debarred from jury duty, while others had
the privilege of declining the service. It cannot be argued suc-
cessfully that under no circumstances may the legislature change
such qualifications without an amendment to the constitution....
Trial by jury meant an unanimous decision of twelve persons of
the the same class as the defendant. The defendant was to be
tried by his peers. The essential features were the number, the
impartiality and the unanimity. The legislature has the power
to prescribe qualifications .... It would indeed be a most literal
adherence to an ancient method if it must be said the legislature
has no power or authority to vary the qualifications. One would
be required to hark back to the days of Magna Charta under
such an interpretation. Legislation must of necessity take into
consideration the change in conditions and in applying the estab-
lished principles to these changes must make changes in the
applications from time to time. This is done without sacrifice
of principle and makes legislation compatible with the state of
society of the day." Burr,' Ch. J., in State v. Norton, 64 N. D.
675, 682, 255 N. W. 787, 790 (1934).
The use of the word "men" in the last clause of Section 7
does not show an intention to limit jury duty to men only. "We
interpret the word 'men' in the thought of the convention and
of the people of the day as meaning those persons who possessed
the qualifications of jurors at that time, with no thought of sex.
The constitution is a living, breathing, vital instrument, adaptable
to the needs of the day, and was so intended by the people when
adopted. It was not a hard and fast piece of legislation, but a
declaration of principles of government for the pretection and
guidance of those upon whose shoulders the government rested."
Id., 64 N. D. 686, 255 N. W. 792.
The requirement of unanimity is violated by a statute per-
mitting a five-sixth verdict in civil cases where, after 12 hours
of deliberation, the jury cannot agree. The test to be applied
in construing Section 7 is that of the intention of the drafters
of the constitution. "What was the situation in Dakota Territory,
presumably known to the members of the Constitutional Con-
vention and to the people when the constitution was adopted,
with respect to trial by jury? This is a legitimate inquiry since
we are called upon to determine what sort of a 'trial by jury'
'shall ... remain inviolation' under section 7 of the Bill of Rights.
An answer to the question may tend to throw some light on the
intention of the people who adopted the insturment and the true
purpose of the clause....
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